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Abstract—Critical infrastructure (CI) services are consumed
by the society constantly and we expect them to be available
24 hours a day. A common definition is that CIs are so vital
to our society that a disruption or destruction would have a
severe impact on the social well-being and the economy on
a national and an international level. CIs can be mutually
dependent on each other and a failure in one infrastructure
can cascade to another interdependent infrastructure to cause
service disruptions. Methods to better assess and monitor CIs
and their interdependencies in order to predict possible risks
have to be developed.
This work addresses the problem of the quality of infor-
mation exchanged among interconnected CI, the quality of
the relationship in terms of trust and security and the use of
Trust and Reputation management along with the Policy Based
Management paradigm is the proposed solution to be applied
at the CI interconnection points for information exchange.
Keywords-Critical Infrastructures, ICT security, Trust and
Reputation Management
I. INTRODUCTION
Although large efforts have been made in modelling CI
risks, the information gathered from those models is still
kept inside each CI and is not shared among interdependent
CI.
The introduction of mechanisms for sharing risk informa-
tion can, along with more resilient CI, increase the security
level of multiple interdependent CI. To achieve these ser-
vice levels, a robust, resilient and inter-dependencies-aware
alerting system need to be implemented. This is the main
goal of MICIE (Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure
mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information
infrastructures) FP7-ICT project, aiming the design and
implementation of a real-time risk level dissemination and
alerting system [1]. MICIE overall architecture is presented
in Figure 1.
In this work we briefly present the MICIE Alerting System
and describe the mechanisms for information exchange
among CI, namely, the Secure Mediation Gateway (SMGW),
the trust and reputation mechanisms and the use of the Policy
Based Management paradigm.
II. POLICY BASED MANAGEMENT
The SMGW Manager handles issues regarding authoriza-
tion, authentication and accounting controlling both inter-
action with peer SMGWs and all the internal operation of
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Figure 1. MICIE overall system and SMGW architecture [2]
the SMGW, including also testing, alarming, management
of intrusion prevention and detection functions and the
management of the Reputation Service[3] .
The proposed approach provides the CI operator with
a tool where he can define, in a high level manner, the
behaviour he pretends for the system. Traditional approaches
are mainly oriented to the management of individual com-
ponents, not considering the system structure as a whole.
The CI operator can define policies that will address the
relations between local SMGW and foreign SMGWs, in-
cluding defining how each particular CI can connect and data
access policies. The SMGW manager GUI will allow browse
existent information and define actions that remote SMGWs
can perform (e.g. write and/or read risk information). All
data access controls are implemented with a high level of
granularity thus maintaining simplicity [4].
III. TRUST MODEL
Although a communication system for information ex-
change among CIs can be seen as a closed system where
it is supposed that partners trust each other, it’s possible
for a partner CI to provide inaccurate information, either
maliciously or due to faulty components in its monitoring
framework.
In this context the need of a Trust and Reputation Service
on each CI was identified, able to maintain real time trust
information about peering CIs and interdependent services.
This service will monitor information exchanged between
peers and also the partner behaviour in terms of ICT security
in order to manage reputation and to infer a trust level for
each one.
The interactions between peers are monitored to gather
intelligence about the partnership. Thus if one partner CI be-
haves incorrectly according to defined policies, for example
by repeating the tentative of retrieve private information, this
can be seen as an ICT incident and evaluate a trust indicator
based on this type of information.
The Trust and Reputation Service (TRS) evaluates infor-
mation exchanged between CIs in order to infer a trust level
for each transaction. This service incorporates a level of
trust on the data received from each partner, allowing that
trust levels are incorporated in risk assessments as a mean
to improve its accuracy and its resilience to inconsistent
information. It will be possible, for instance, to give more
weight to highly trusted data or to ignore data provided by
low-trust partners [2].
IV. CONCLUSION
This work reports some research achievements in MICIE
project, namely the development of a Policy based Man-
agement tool for the SMGW and the incorporation of the
concept of Trust and Reputation in the SMGW.
Trust indicators and the use of policies can enhance
risk indicators accuracy, help incorporating trust in system
management and also help CI operator to evaluate the
relation between his CI and their peers.
Results from the validation process are promising, demon-
strating the ability to improve CI interoperation security.
Prototypes for the presented solutions are already devel-
oped and the Authors expect to evaluate this proposal within
the MICIE project starting with a simple reference scenario
that encompasses a small portion of an electricity distri-
bution network and an interdependent telecommunications
network [5]. Planned validation work for the MICIE project
will also include more complex scenarios, provided by the
Israel Electric Corporation.
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